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PANEL I: Monsanto v. Scruggs: The 
Scope of Downstream 
Licensing Restrictions  
Moderator: John Richards∗
Panelists: Mark R. Patterson† 
Richard B. Ulmer Jr.‡ 
Peter Carstensen§ 
Jay P. Kesan||
MR. RUBIN: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.  My name 
is Jay Rubin.  I am the editor-in-chief of the Fordham Intellectual 
Property Journal.  I want to thank you all for coming. 
I also want to thank our panelists and the faculty, Profs. 
Hansen, Katyal, Richards, and Patterson, who have participated 
today. 
I want to thank Helen Herman and her administrative staff for 
helping us put this together.  I also want to thank my editorial 
board and staff, and especially Brian Danitz, for really putting an 
outstanding program together today. 
To introduce our program and to welcome us, we are graced by 
Dean Treanor.  Also I want to thank him for his participation and 
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† Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.S.E.E., Ohio State University, 
1978; M.S. (Electrical Engineering), Ohio State University, 1980; J.D., Stanford 
University, 1991. 
‡ Latham & Watkins. B.S., University of Nebraska, Omaha, 1977; J.D., Stanford 
University, 1986. 
§  Professor, University of Wisconsin College of Law. B.A., University of Wisconsin; 
M.A., Yale University; LL.B., Yale Law School. 
|| Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. M.S., Ph.D. University of Texas at 
Austin; J.D., Georgetown University School of Law. 
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support, for us to be able to put a symposium together every year.  
Thank you. 
Here is Dean Treanor. 
DEAN TREANOR: Thanks very much, Jay.  Welcome. 
One of our great strengths at Fordham is intellectual property 
law.  I am really delighted about that. 
In the summer of 1981, when I was a summer associate, I was 
working for a big law firm, and I was the first summer associate 
they had ever assigned to intellectual property.  They didn’t have 
enough for me to do, so I wound up mostly doing antitrust.  That, 
for me, captures—now, intellectual property is a mainstay for all of 
the big firms and so many specialty firms—it really captures how, 
in a quarter of a century, intellectual property has really moved to 
the center of law. 
We are very fortunate at Fordham to have faculty who are so 
strongly at the cutting edge.  I would like to recognize in particular 
Prof. Mark Patterson, who will be on the first panel, Prof. Katyal, 
Prof. Hansen, all of whom will be part of the program today and 
are really part of what I think is one of the most impressive 
intellectual property faculties in the country.  We have increasingly 
stressed that area.  This year we started for the first time a graduate 
program in intellectual property and information law, which is a 
terrific, terrific program, and, again, really highlights how much at 
the core of Fordham’s operations intellectual property is. 
One of our gems is our journal.  The Intellectual Property Law 
Journal is really, year in and year out, one of the leading fora for 
the discussion of cutting-edge intellectual property issues in 
general.  These symposia, year in and year out, take what really are 
the most pressing issues and bring together extraordinary 
practitioners and faculty members to work through them.  So it is 
one of our great traditions here.  I have to say, this program, I 
think, is particularly exciting.  It really is dazzling for me to look at 
the panelists who have been assembled and the importance of the 
topics that you will be looking at today. 
I want to recognize the staff of the IPLJ for putting this 
together.  In particular, I want to recognize Jay, who has done such 
a terrific job as editor-in-chief; Managing Editor Ashok Chandra, 
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who is just fabulous, as well as being, like myself, a great Harry 
Potter fan—we were discussing the new Harry Potter movie on the 
way in—and I would particularly like to recognize Brian Danitz, 
who just put together the most amazing program. 
Without any further ado, let me turn you over to the first panel. 
MR. CHANDRA: Hi, all.  Yes, I am the Harry Potter fan. 
My name is Ashok Chandra, and I am the Managing Editor of 
the IPLJ.  I am the patent guy at the journal.  I will be working at 
Cooper & Dunham next fall. 
I would like to introduce our panel.  Our panelists will discuss 
the degree to which patent holders may impose licensing 
restrictions on end users. 
Our moderator today will be Mr. John Richards.  Mr. Richards 
is a partner at Ladas & Parry and an adjunct professor here at 
Fordham, where he teaches U.S. and international patent law.  Mr. 
Richards joined Ladas & Parry in 1973 and became partner in 
1982.  He is the general editor of The Legal Aspects of Introducing 
Products to the United States1 and co-author of Intellectual 
Property and the Internal Market of the European Community.2
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, Ashok.  Good morning. 
As Dean Treanor said, when he started off in big firms, 
antitrust was up and IP was down.  Now we have IP up and 
antitrust I am not quite sure where, but I think it is beginning to 
come back after a period in the doldrums. 
What we are looking at this morning is very much the interface 
between antitrust and intellectual property.  We have had a number 
of criticisms of the patent system over the last few years.  This 
conference last year looked at some of those.  Some of the issues 
which come up go to the scope of what you can do with a patent, 
what you can do with an invention, how broadly you can get 
protection for an invention.  Last year we were looking at what you 
need to do from the patent side; this year we are looking at what 
 1 JOHN RICHARDS, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTRODUCING PRODUCTS TO THE U.S. MARKET 
(1988). 
 2 PETER GROVES, TONY MARTINO, CLAIRE MISKIN & JOHN RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE INTERNAL MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1993). 
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you can do in order to get a patent and how broadly the patent can 
be—that was last year.  This year it is how we can use the patent 
and what limitations we have on the use of the patent, in view of 
the resurgent antitrust law. 
Mark Patterson, who is a full-time professor here, will kick off 
with a general overview, and then we will move on to some of the 
more specific post-sale use restrictions and issues of that type. 
PROF. PATTERSON: [Slide]  Actually, I am not just 
providing an overview.  I have a few things to say about my view 
about the appropriate scope of field-of-use licensing as well.  But I 
am going to begin with an overview. 
[Slide]  The practice of field-of-use licensing involves the 
licensing of patents under a contract or license that imposes 
restrictions on what the licensee can do with the patented 
invention.  An example from the Supreme Court was the General 
Talking Pictures case3, which involved a license to manufacture 
audio amplifiers, but restricted the manufacturer to manufacturing 
them for sale for home use.  In other words, the patentee was 
trying to split up the market between those manufacturing for 
home use, where the sales would be at a lower price, and those 
manufacturing for commercial use, where the price would 
presumably be higher—though there is some issue in the case as to 
whether the amplifiers themselves were actually different. 
[Slide]  Here are more recent examples that will be discussed 
today: 
The Lexmark case4 in the Ninth Circuit, in which the use 
restriction involved allowed buyers of toner cartridges to use the 
cartridge, but not to refill it.  So you could only use the cartridge 
once and then return it to Lexmark—that is, if you did anything 
else with it after using it, you returned it to Lexmark.  The 
Lexmark5 case actually involved an option.  Lexmark also let you 
buy the printer cartridge with the right to refill it at a higher price.  
 3 General Talking Pictures v. Western Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938). 
 4 Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
 5 Id. 
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I don’t actually know whether anybody ever did buy it—we may 
learn that today—at the higher price. 
Another case we will be talking about today—two of the 
panelists here, Prof. Carstensen and I, were involved in it, in one 
way or another—involved a license to plant seed incorporating a 
patented gene, but you could only plant the seed in one growing 
season.6  In other words, you couldn’t plant the seed, then harvest 
the seeds from the plants, and then plant again the next season.  
You had to buy new seed the next season, rather than engaging in 
seed saving. 
The New York Times had an article about this general issue 
about a month or two ago, commenting on the Lexmark case, 
which was decided recently.7  They raised the question: Suppose a 
car manufacturer—and a car is certainly going to include some 
patented inventions—instead of selling you the car, had a little 
license agreement on the car, so that when you took possession of 
the car, you didn’t actually own it, but you possessed it under a 
license that wouldn’t allow you to sell it as a used car.8  The Times 
hypothesized this as the bottom of the slippery slope, presumably, 
in the issue of field-of-use licensing.9
[Slide]  On the previous slide I characterized these things as 
licenses.  There is some question, particularly as in the New York 
Times example, of whether we should characterize them as licenses 
or sales.  This matters for the purposes of patent law, because the 
patent law has a first sale doctrine, or an exhaustion doctrine, that 
says that once the item has been sold, then the patentee has no 
further patent rights in it.  The property rights are exhausted at that 
point.  Presumably you can still have contractual restrictions, but 
you wouldn’t be able to enforce them through infringement suits, 
just through breach-of-contract actions.  And there would be some 
question even about that, because some contractual restrictions 
would probably be impermissible under antitrust law, for example. 
 6 See Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 342 F. Supp. 2d 584 (N.D. Miss. 
2004), appeal pending, Nos. 04-1532, 05-1120, 05-1121 (Fed. Cir. argued May 1, 2006). 
 7 J.A. Biersdorfer, By Tearing Open That Cardboard Box, Are You Also Signing on the 
Dotted Line?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2005, at C4. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
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On the other hand, the way the law currently stands, at least in 
the Federal Circuit, is that if the patentee’s transfer is under a 
license, with a condition, then any use outside the terms of the 
license condition is infringement, which converts the breach-of-
contract action into a patent-infringement action, which has 
implications for remedies, in terms of attorneys’ fees and perhaps 
multiple damages.  Moreover, the property protections, then, as 
property protections do, carry on down the line to downstream 
purchasers. 
[Slide]  The Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have 
couched the terminology of what sorts of use restrictions are 
permissible similarly.  The Supreme Court says it is “reasonably 
within the reward which the patentee . . . is entitled,”10 and the 
Federal Circuit says “reasonably within the patent grant or relates 
to subject matter within the scope of the claims.”11  The Federal 
Circuit has said that it may be permissible anyway, if it is not 
anticompetitive.  But the language that the two courts use is more 
or less the same.  But that, I think, is largely where the similarity 
ends. 
[Slide]  The Supreme Court hasn’t decided any of these cases 
lately, so it is all rather historical.  But its approach historically has 
been on this distinction between property and contract.  This may 
be a stretch, but when you read the Supreme Court’s decisions, 
they actually seem to use the terms “license” and “contract” 
advisedly, in that every license is a contract, but not every contract 
is a license.  I have argued in an amicus brief—almost convincing 
myself—that they use these distinct terms intentionally and mean 
to maintain the distinction.12
In any case, what they have said is that there are several types 
of restrictions that would be permissible as a matter of contract, but 
would not raise issues of patent law.13  In other words, you could 
sue in a breach-of-contract action, but you couldn’t sue, even if the 
contract is breached, for patent infringement.  One of the examples 
 10 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938). 
 11 See, e.g., U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 12 Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 2001 U.S. Fed. Cir. Briefs 1108 (2002). 
 13 Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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was with a geographical restriction, when a purchaser was, in 
effect, evading the geographical restriction of the patentee, and the 
Court said maybe the patentee could stop that through contract, but 
it could not do it through a patent infringement suit, because once 
the first transfer happens to the first purchaser/licensee, that 
purchaser can sell it anywhere without being subject to any 
restrictions. 
The Federal Circuit, on the other hand, has this doctrine about 
whether it is within the scope of the patent claims, but it has not 
exactly said what that means.  It can’t just mean infringement, 
because if there were no infringement, then this would never be an 
issue.  This issue only comes up when the purchaser is using the 
invention in some way, and so is, arguably, infringing.  There has 
to be some narrower category of things—narrower than 
infringement—that raises this issue.  It is not clear what that is. 
The Federal Circuit has written as though the patentee could do 
almost anything in the way of use restrictions, though it really 
hasn’t held that, and its statements, even, have been not entirely 
consistent.  So it is a little difficult to know what the law is. 
[Slide]  So we have the contract/property distinction I mention 
below.  I think you can read the cases as reflecting this—the 
Federal Circuit takes an approach that is all based on contract, that 
the nature of the rights transferred is just a matter of the terms of 
the license between the patentee and the purchaser.  So it is all a 
matter of consent of the two parties. 
Whereas the Supreme Court—and, again, these are old cases; it 
is hard to know what the Court would do now—seems to focus on 
the nature of the invention.  The invention is the “thing.”  I will 
come to some ways in which that conception is reflected in the 
Court’s opinions in a moment.  The Supreme Court focuses on a 
contract or quasi-contract between the patentee and society.  The 
patentee gets exclusive rights, the society gets the information, and 
that establishes the patent rights.  So the contract is defined by the 
claims, in some sense, is defined by the nature of the invention, not 
by the contract between the patentee and the licensee. 
So the Supreme Court has this whole property conception, and 
the downstream restrictions are like restraints on alienation.  Once 
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you acquire the thing, you are allowed to do whatever you want 
with it, and contract does not give the patentee the right to impose 
the restrictions, because that would be restraint on alienation.  That 
is the flavor of the Court’s decisions. 
[Slide]  One way this comes up is that the Supreme Court has 
established that the purchaser of a patented product has the right to 
repair it.  The language of these cases focuses on the idea that 
when you get the product, you get this “thing.”  In one of the best-
known cases, you get a convertible top, and when the fabric wears 
out, you get to replace the fabric, because you still have the right to 
the convertible top, and only part of it is worn out, so you can 
repair it, so as to maintain the value of this thing that you acquired 
from the patentee.14
The Federal Circuit has said, or at least suggested, in a case 
involving a license restriction that said you have the right to use 
the invention only once, that if that restriction is valid—it didn’t 
hold that it was valid, but it suggested that it was (this is the 
Mallinckrodt case15)—if that single-use restriction is valid, then 
you have basically eliminated the right to repair. 
In my view, that can’t be right.  When you read the Supreme 
Court opinions on the right of repair, nothing suggests that the 
patentee could just, by contract, get rid of those.  Nothing holds 
that they can’t either.  So the law is certainly unclear, but it is not 
the basic thrust of the opinions.  Those Supreme Court repair 
opinions, in contrast to some of the other field-of-use opinions, are 
actually fairly recent. 
[Slide]  Finally, downstream restrictions—that is, restrictions 
either on the ultimate user of the product or on the second 
purchaser of the product.  The manufacturing patentee might sell to 
a dealer, who then sells to an ultimate consumer. 
The Supreme Court has never upheld a use restriction against a 
downstream purchaser who bought validly from a licensee.  In 
General Talking Pictures,16 it held the final purchaser liable for 
infringement, but that was because the licensee had sold in 
 14 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964). 
 15 Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 16 General Talking Pictures v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938). 
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violation of the terms of the license.  The Court made it fairly clear 
that that was the reason. 
On the other hand, although it has never upheld such an 
infringement decision, it has also never rejected one, because it 
hasn’t really had the opportunity to do so. 
The Federal Circuit, in contrast, has never disallowed a 
restriction on a purchaser and generally has suggested that they are 
within the scope of the patent.  On the other hand, it has never 
upheld one either, because it has always remanded for 
consideration by the trial court or has rejected a trial court’s 
narrow construction of what is permissible. 
So there is a huge range between what the Supreme Court has 
said is impermissible and what the Federal Circuit has said is 
permissible.  It is not at all clear where the line is drawn there. 
[Slide]  So I want to ask, when we think about downstream 
restrictions, what should we do?  If we can think about how patent 
protection typically works, the basic structure is that we are willing 
to suffer the higher costs of patented products because they are the 
costs of creating the incentive.  When you add in the downstream 
restriction idea, you add an additional cost in there, I would say—
at least often—which is the uncertainty of subsequent purchasers 
of whether they are subject to whatever restrictions were imposed 
upstream.  The subsequent purchaser, in many cases—like the 
farmer in Monsanto17—Monsanto licenses its patented invention to 
seed partners, who then put the gene in the seeds and then sell it to 
the farmer.  Monsanto imposes restrictions between itself and the 
seed partner about what they can do.  Monsanto seeks to impose 
restrictions on the farmers as well, by labels on the package.  But 
depending on how the farmer acquires the seeds, the farmer may 
not be party to any contract that puts the farmer on notice of the 
restrictions to which it is subject. 
That would mean it is not subject to a breach-of-contract 
action, but, because the courts have generally held that the 
upstream purchaser can only transfer what it has, courts have 
 17 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 342 F. Supp. 2d 584 (N.D. Miss. 
2004), appeal docketed, Nos. 04-1532, 05-1120, 05-1121 (Fed. Cir. argued May 1, 2006). 
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sometimes held that the downstream purchaser—the farmer—will 
be subject to whatever restrictions were imposed upstream, even if 
it doesn’t know about them.  That is the nature of property rights. 
[Slide]  The other issue is that downstream restrictions, at least 
if there is an intermediate market—say, a dealer market or 
Monsanto’s seed partners—downstream restrictions on the farmers 
inevitably are going to impose some sort of constraint on what 
goes on in that intermediate market.  That is something that the 
patentee shouldn’t be able to control. 
[Slide]  If we accept that downstream restrictions pose these 
sorts of problems, then we can ask ourselves, why would we allow 
them at all?  One reason is that they would allow the patentee to 
price-discriminate among users.  Different users might have 
different uses for the invention, and the patentee might want to 
charge higher prices for some uses than for others.  That would 
increase the revenue to the patentee and presumably, therefore, 
increase the incentive for creative activity, and that might be good.  
The other possibility is that it could allow the patentee to maintain 
profits against competition from users.  So the users might do 
something downstream that would tend to degrade or lessen the 
profits of the patentee, and that would be a bad thing, thus reducing 
the incentive. 
So let’s talk about these for a minute. 
[Slide]  Price discrimination: The welfare effects of price 
discrimination are generally ambiguous.  We don’t entirely know 
whether it is good.  But, maybe more doctrinally, the Supreme 
Court has disallowed practices that allow patentees to price-
discriminate.  For example, tying arrangements are often used as a 
means of price discrimination.  The Supreme Court has said, 
however, that you cannot use a patented product to tie purchases of 
unpatented products, even though the purpose of that may have no 
competitive effect in the unpatented product market, but may just 
serve to maximize revenue in the patented market. 
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The repair right does this as well.  Think about Lexmark.18  
The reason that Lexmark wants to impose the no-refill restriction is 
so that—or the effect, at least, of imposing the no-refill restriction 
is that if you are a heavy user of printer cartridges, the absence of 
the ability to refill means you have to go back to Lexmark and buy 
more, so they are, effectively, going to be able to charge more to 
heavy users of their printer cartridges than to less heavy users of 
their printer cartridges and effectively get a price discrimination 
scheme there. 
[Slide]  “Should we allow this?” is the question.  I have argued, 
in an article several years ago, that for a use restriction to provide 
valid price discrimination—that is, price discrimination that we 
think should be okay under patent law—the discrimination should 
be based on the use of the invention.19  So I would say that in 
Lexmark, if it has inventions related to how you refill the 
cartridges, then it makes perfect sense to not allow people to refill 
the cartridges.  If their inventions with regard to the cartridge are, 
say, related to delivery of the toner material from the cartridge, but 
have nothing to do with refilling, then the price discrimination that 
they are engaging in isn’t related to the difference in the uses of the 
purchaser, and is therefore unrelated to the invention, in that sense, 
and, I would say, shouldn’t be permissible. 
In Monsanto, you could argue that it should have to turn on the 
difference between planting for crop—that is, planting a cotton 
crop to get the cotton—or planting the cotton crop to get the seeds.  
Of course, the act of planting is the same, regardless.  As the 
Federal Circuit has acknowledged, it just doesn’t make any 
difference.20  You plant the same way, whether you are planting 
for a crop or for a seed.21
[Slide]  What about the other reason, profit maintenance?  The 
way this works is that you can imagine that what happens 
downstream can affect the patentee’s profits.  The Supreme Court 
 18 Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
 19 Mark R. Patterson, When Is Property Intellectual?  The Leveraging Problem, 73 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 1133, 1142–43 (2000). 
 20 See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 21 Id.  
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has said that a patentee can impose downstream license restrictions 
that enable it to protect its own profit stream.  It may be 
competing, in some sense, with the downstream purchasers or the 
licensees.  In the General Electric case, it said it can control their 
prices and restrict what they can do in order to protect its own 
sales.22  It actually wasn’t quite as explicit as that, but that is how 
General Electric is generally read. 
[Slide]  But for that to make sense, the way the downstream 
purchaser typically, in these use-restriction cases, competes with 
the patentee is by making the product.  Now, you don’t need a use 
restriction to prevent the downstream purchaser from making the 
product.  That is illegal under Section 271 of the patent statutes.23  
So you really wouldn’t need a use restriction to do it.  For 
example, in the Lexmark case, you ask, does Lexmark need to do 
this to effectively prevent its purchasers from making new 
cartridges by refilling them?24  That implicates the repair/ 
reconstruction doctrine.  We have a body of law, or at least a 
doctrine, that is supposed to deal with this.  If it is repair, it is 
permissible; if it is reconstruction, that is making the product and it 
is impermissible.  So we could deal with that under the 
repair/reconstruction doctrine. 
Instead, Lexmark is basically evading the repair/reconstruction 
doctrine by imposing use restrictions.25  I would argue that that 
shouldn’t be permissible.  I have a citation to the Jazz Photo case 
there on the slide, in which the Federal Circuit said that, in a 
disposable camera, replacing the film cartridge after it is used is 
repair, not reconstruction.26  I am not sure I agree with that 
decision on the facts, but at least it suggests the kind of inquiry that 
I would think could be made in the Lexmark context as well. 
[Slide]  Also, a use restriction shouldn’t require the purchaser 
to get additional products in order to operate.  That is the problem 
 22 U.S. v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926). 
 23 See 35 U.S.C. § 271. 
 24 See Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Jazz Photo Corp. v. ITC, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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in the Monsanto case.27  In Monsanto, the question would be, if 
you require the farmer to purchase seeds every year, then the 
farmer is not just purchasing Monsanto’s gene, which Monsanto 
does have the right to control, but is also purchasing the rest of the 
seed, which was produced by the seed partner.28  In order, then, to 
prevent the competition from the farmer, who is, in effect, 
producing seed in competition with Monsanto, you are also 
restricting the farmer from doing something else that it is allowed 
to do, which is to re-create the portions of the seed that are 
introduced by the seed partner and have no intellectual property 
protection.  In effect, I would say Monsanto is overreaching in its 
effort to try to avoid competition. 
So I would have concerns about both Lexmark’s and 
Monsanto’s practices, though the concerns are animated by 
different aspects of the problem. 
[Slide]  Seeds are weird, though.  Seeds are self-replicating.  
Lexmark’s toner cartridge does not make new copies of itself, but 
seeds do.  The Federal Circuit, in the McFarling case,29 said they 
are a special category, which makes sense.  Then Judge Gajarsa in 
SmithKline30 said these sorts of things are not patentable at all.  
That would make this inquiry quite easy, of course.  But I am not 
sure I would go that far. 
You can see what is going to happen.  If Monsanto is not 
allowed to impose this one-season-only restriction, it is only going 
to be able to sell these things once, because once it makes one sale 
of the seeds, the farmers will replant the seeds the next year.  It 
basically makes the sale one year, and that is it, which means it is 
going to have to raise the price considerably that very first year.  I 
guess Monsanto could argue, “If we do that, the problem is, we are 
basically going to lose out in the market.  The price is going to be 
too high.  Farmers can’t afford it.  They will have to take out loans 
or something.” 
 27 Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 342 F. Supp. 2d 584 (N.D. Miss. 
2004), appeal docketed, Nos. 04-1532, 05-1120, 05-1121 (Fed. Cir. argued May 1, 2006). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 30 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
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I guess one response I have to that is, “So what?”  You are not 
entitled to a particular pricing technique that will allow you to 
maximize your profits under the patent law.  You are only allowed 
to exclude.  So if you are excluding in some illegitimate way, that 
is going farther than you ought to be allowed to. 
The other answer I would have is, maybe you could get a 
process claim, get a process claim to the use of the seeds.  There is 
still a problem there, in that there might be implied license issues 
when you sell the seeds the initial time.  But at least then we focus 
on what is going on here.  We basically focus on whether, in fact, 
your implied license would carry through to previous years in a 
way that reflects the basic structure of patent law and creates the 
proper incentives, rather than allowing contract to impose the 
patentee’s view of what patent law ought to do on purchasers.  It 
would focus us back on the patentee-society bargain, not on the 
patentee-licensee bargain.  That should generally be the approach 
in these cases. 
Thank you. 
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, Mark. 
Our next speaker is Dick Ulmer of Latham & Watkins, who 
was involved in the Lexmark31 case and might take a different 
view. 
MR. ULMER: Thank you. 
I thought what I might do is just spend ten minutes or so giving 
you a thumbnail sketch of the Lexmark32 case and, in the course of 
that, will touch on a few of the points that Prof. Patterson raised. 
Lexmark, for those of you who don’t know it, is a company 
that was spun off from IBM in 1991–1992.  Its primary mission is 
to make computer printers, both laser and ink-jet, although the 
issues in the case that we are going to be talking about deal solely 
with laser cartridges.  Lexmark is number two in computer 
printers.  Number one, by a big margin, is Hewlett-Packard.  HP is 
 31 Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
 32 Id. 
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the 800-pound gorilla in this market space, as they would say in 
Silicon Valley. 
One of the ways that Lexmark has tried to improve its market 
position is—it noted that the remanufacturing of the cartridges was 
becoming more prevalent.  None of Lexmark’s competitors—HP, 
Canon, Brother, Epson—was really getting into that 
remanufactured cartridge market.  So Lexmark said, “We’re going 
to do that.  Why are we going to do that?” 
Number one is for an environmental purpose.  It is better to 
have cartridges reused than have them end up somewhere in a 
landfill. 
Number two is that some of the cartridges that were being 
remanufactured by the remanufacturing industry, which is largely 
kind of a mom-and-pop industry of tens of thousands of small 
competitors around the United States and around the world—some 
of those cartridges, frankly, aren’t very good.  They leak in the 
machines, sometimes even destroy the machines.  When the user 
then goes and opens up the machine and sees that the machine is 
broken, they don’t blame the remanufacturer; they blame Lexmark.  
They don’t know where the remanufactured cartridge may have 
come from.  So that was another reason for Lexmark’s desire to get 
into remanufacturing. 
The third one is, frankly, a desire to make profits, to get into 
this market that nobody else was tapping. 
How did Lexmark go about doing this?  They decided to 
institute a label license that requires, as Prof. Patterson said, the 
cartridge to be returned to Lexmark only, if people are going to 
return it.  What the customer gets in return for that is what is called 
a “Prebate,” which is a play on the word “rebate” and the word 
“pre.”33  Instead of having to send in a coupon to get your rebate—
this just happened to me the other day.  We bought a cell phone for 
my daughter, and there is a $50.00 thing you have to send in.  Just 
before I left to come out here, I said, “Honey, where’s that 
coupon?”  She goes, “I don’t know.”  So we are going to have to 
chase the thing down. 
 33 Id. at 983. 
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Lexmark said, “Let’s just give the rebate right up front.”  So 
you can buy a Prebate cartridge with the license restriction that you 
return the cartridge to Lexmark, if you are going to return it.  You 
can also buy a regular cartridge, without the Prebate restriction. 
You will be happy to know that the data shows that about 10 to 
15 percent of people do buy the regular cartridge.  Because they 
are honest, they don’t want to cheat on the license agreement.  
What they do is, they have what are called closed-loop systems, 
where they remanufacture the same cartridge up to six or seven 
times, and thereby recover their costs in that way.  So there are 
sales of the non-Prebate regular cartridges. 
Lexmark was very careful in structuring this program.  They 
very closely followed the Mallinckrodt case,34 which was of great 
interest to them.  The other key case in this field, although it is not 
a patent case, is the ProCD case,35 which, to our mind, is the key 
case saying that shrink-wrap, label, click-through licenses are 
valid.  That was really kind of the first case in that field.  The last 
time I checked, there are in the range of thirty to forty ProCD-type 
cases.  There have been a lot of challenges of shrink-wrap licenses, 
but I have to tell you that the results have been overwhelmingly in 
favor of shrink-wrap licenses.  I think the last time I checked, the 
margin is about five to one.  So shrink-wrap licenses are here to 
stay. 
What happened next?  Lexmark’s program ran for about four 
years, and then a group called the Arizona Cartridge 
Remanufacturers Association sued Lexmark.  This association was 
a gathering of these small remanufacturers, who put together a war 
chest to sue Lexmark to try to stop this program.  Their concern, I 
think, was not so much Lexmark as they were afraid that HP and 
the other competitors in the market would adopt the same sorts of 
programs that Lexmark had adopted. 
I said that they put together a war chest.  Frankly, it wasn’t a 
real big war chest.  They didn’t sue under antitrust law or they 
didn’t sue for patent misuse, but they sued under a couple of 
unique California statutes called Business and Professions Code 
 34 Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 35 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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17200 and 17500.36  These are very, very broad unfair-competition 
laws in California, and practitioners there know that it is close to 
malpractice not to toss a 17200 claim into any suit you file these 
days.  It is so broad that it outlaws anything that is “unfair.” 
With respect to business-to-business transactions, the 
California Supreme Court has trimmed back on that a little, but as 
far as consumer transactions go, anything that is unfair is illegal.  
You can imagine what kind of trouble that standard causes. 
The plaintiffs’ theories, to put it charitably, went through a lot 
of evolution in this case.  What finally wound up in the Ninth 
Circuit was nowhere to be found in anything that they had ever 
pleaded.  But that’s litigation.  We roll with the punches and 
address the arguments that are presented when they are presented.  
What it was, was essentially a false advertising case.  What the 
plaintiffs were saying was that Lexmark, by saying that the Prebate 
license was legal, was misrepresenting the facts.  Our rejoinder to 
that was pretty obvious: Whatever you think of the Mallinckrodt 
case,37 it has been the law of the land for twelve years now.  We 
are just stating the facts.  ProCD,38 at that time, had been the law 
of the land for ten years.  So we said, this is a pretty simple case.  
We can’t possibly be guilty of falsely advertising what is entirely 
true. 
To my mind, the most interesting issues were raised very late 
in the game.  In fact, we heard one of them for the first time, I 
think, in the oral argument before the Ninth Circuit.  They had to 
do with, first, the old-fashioned contract notion of privity.  The 
argument was that the end user/buyer of this cartridge doesn’t have 
a contract with Lexmark, according to the plaintiffs.  What the 
Ninth Circuit said to that was what Judge Easterbrook said to the 
ProCD plaintiff back in that case, and that is that what Lexmark 
does by having this label license is offers to the buyer, “You can 
use this cartridge if you agree to the terms of our license.”  So that 
is the offer; that is the acceptance; that is the privity. 
 36 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17500 (1977). 
 37 Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d 700. 
 38 ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447. 
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The other interesting issue had to do with the downstream 
issues that Prof. Patterson was talking about earlier.  In the 
Monsanto cases,39 Monsanto has a very elaborate system of special 
licenses that it has with its seed company partners and then there 
are some licenses with the growers.  It is all, to my mind, pretty 
complex.  That simply would not work in a Lexmark-type 
situation, because Lexmark sells its cartridges through so many 
different distribution channels and so many different types of 
distribution channels.  So the argument was the one that Prof. 
Patterson made, essentially: When you made the first sale to a 
distributor, you didn’t have a restriction on that sale, and therefore 
that was an unconditional sale and your patent rights evaporate. 
Our point to that is a pretty simple one.  Everyone in the stream 
of commerce who buys that cartridge takes it with that license.  
Anybody who opens it—what it says, essentially, is, “Open up this 
box, use this cartridge, and you are bound by the license.”  That 
applies to everyone in the stream.  Whether a distributor opened 
the box and used it—not common, but it happens sometimes.  Our 
view is that that solves the downstream problem.  Frankly, I view 
the license schemes in Monsanto as a little bit of belt-and-
suspenders.  I don’t think it is that hard.  I think that a label license 
on a sack of seed would actually be enough. 
The other thing that happened in our case was that the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation—and Brian has included their brief 
in the packet here—filed an amicus brief that invited the Ninth 
Circuit to create a circuit split with the Federal Circuit over 
Mallinckrodt, saying that Mallinckrodt was wrongly decided.40  
We pointed out that that was all very interesting, but what we 
noted was that EFF in its brief never once told the court what kind 
of case our case actually was.  They never mentioned Business and 
 39 Monsanto Co. v Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto v. McFarling, 363 
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 342 F. Supp. 2d 568, 342 F. Supp. 
2d 584 (N.D. Miss. 2004), appeal docketed, Nos. 04-1532, 05-1120, 05-1121 (Fed. Cir. 
argued May 1, 2006). 
40 Brief for Elec. Frontier Found. as Amici Curiae, Ariz. Cartridge Remanufacturers 
Ass’n v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-16987), available at 
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/ACRA_v_Lexmark/20040211_amicus.php (last visited 
Sept. 16, 2006) 
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Professions Code 17200 or 17500.41  So it was really sort of an 
academic exercise on their part.  The Ninth Circuit declined to 
create a circuit split.  I think they dropped a footnote that said, 
“This isn’t before us, and for another day, if ever.” 
I think that is probably it from my perspective.  I guess I would 
say, kind of doctrinally—I am just a country lawyer out there in 
the trenches, trying to win cases, so I tend not to think of things on 
an academic level a whole lot—our basic view of the Mallinckrodt 
case is that all it does is bring patent law into line with antitrust 
law.42  When you go and read the Mallinckrodt case, you see that.  
The Schwinn43 and Sylvania44 cases are cited repeatedly.  What 
Schwinn and Sylvania did was to hold that restrictions after a sale 
were judged under the antitrust rule of reason unless there was 
price fixing involved or some sort of tying.  Otherwise, a rule-of-
reason approach is taken to a restriction after a sale.45
To our mind, all Mallinckrodt did was to allow patent rights, 
the right to exclude, to be treated in the same way as other property 
rights.46  When you step back and think about it, why shouldn’t 
that be so?  Why shouldn’t freedom of contract also apply in the 
patent arena? 
I thought, contrary to what the professor said, the Mallinckrodt 
case was well-reasoned, well-decided.  When you actually go back 
and look at the cases that had established this so-called patent 
exhaustion doctrine, what they were all about was price fixing or 
tying.  As the Federal Circuit pointed out, there is not a single one 
of them that had to do, really, with anything else.  So it was one of 
those things in the law that kind of grew up over time, where 
nobody was really kind of digging in and saying, what do these 
cases really say? 
I think I will leave it at that. 
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you. 
 41 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17500 (1977). 
 42 Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d 700. 
 43 United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
 44 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 45 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49–50. 
 46 See Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d 700. 
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Our next speaker is Peter Carstensen, who is the Young-
Bascom Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin.  He 
comes from an antitrust perspective, I believe. 
[See article below in lieu of presentation transcript.]47
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you. 
Back in the 1970s, there was a thing called “The Nine No-No’s 
of Patent Licensing.”48  It sounds a though we are trying to get 
back to that. 
Jay, maybe you are going to take the view from the intellectual 
property side and readdress the balance here a little bit. 
Jay is a professor at the University of Illinois School of Law 
and is an intellectual property lawyer. 
[See article below in lieu of presentation transcript.]49
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you. 
The problems presented by self-replication, I think, are 
relatively new.  Many of the other issues that come up in this area, 
though, go back at least 100 years.  The idea that a patent right is 
exhausted by first sale is something which has been around for a 
long time.  The contrary idea that the patent owner, when he sells, 
because he has the right also to control use (because the patent 
right includes the right to use the invention, as well as the right to 
make and manufacture it) can impose license conditions, and that 
you simply have an implied license by purchase of the item 
originally, and that the implied license can be overruled by explicit 
provisions—that is the contrary view, which has also been around 
for 100 years. 
I think we have heard some very contrasting opinions on which 
of those two approaches is appropriate. 
 47 Peter Carstensen, Post-Sale Restraints via Patent Licensing: A “Seedcentric” 
Perspective, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1053 (2006). 
 48 See Bruce B. Wilson, Patent and Know-How License Agreements: Field of Use, 
Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions, Address Before the Fourth New England 
Antitrust Conference (Nov. 6, 1970). 
 49 Jay P. Kesan, Licensing Restrictions and Appropriating Market Benefits from Plant 
Innovation, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1081 (2006). 
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Maybe, Peter, you would kick off with your views on that, and 
then we can develop it out from there. 
PROF. CARSTENSEN: I think maybe I was too reticent about 
it. 
PROF. KESAN: I have never heard Peter be reticent on 
anything. 
PROF. CARSTENSEN: I do think that we need to be very 
restrictive on the number of circumstances in which the bundle of 
rights that go into a patented product or process get severed and 
controlled post-sale or after the developer has substantially parted 
with dominion and control over the product or process.  Jay gave 
you a bit more of the agricultural stuff.  It is sort of funny—a guy 
from Illinois and a guy from Wisconsin coming out to New York 
City to talk about crop issues. 
PROF. PATTERSON: And Mr. Ulmer said he is just a country 
lawyer, too. 
PROF. CARSTENSEN: That is right.  And I happen to know 
that you are from Ohio and have a little bit of a rural background 
yourself. 
It seems to me that what is required, again, is very cautious 
acceptance of the post-sale kind of restriction.  I am not prepared 
to say they are categorically bad, though I come a lot closer to that 
than many people would like. 
Again, what was interesting was the way that Jay did not 
engage fully with the alternative that I was talking about, except to 
say he rather liked it, at the end, when he talked about anybody 
with over 150 acres paying the seed cleaner.  Seed cleaners are key 
players.  They are indispensable in cotton.  You cannot save 
cottonseed without going to a seed cleaner, and you really need to 
use a seed cleaner in soybeans if you want to have any success at 
all in saving your crop. 
So there is a bottleneck through which these things will pass.  
The point for competition in the market and competition in 
technology is that if you are very restrictive and you say to 
Monsanto, “Gee, guys, you have a problem here because of this 
replication,” and we, as a matter of patent law, decide that this 
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really is the making or the using of the patented product without a 
license—and that is a contentious issue, and I am skeptical, myself.  
I think that requires Congress to act.  Rather than the courts 
rewriting what Congress has written in the past, let Congress 
resolve that directly. 
But at that point, we say, “Okay, you can put your tax on, but it 
can’t be in the form of forcing people to buy new seed.”  There are 
two reasons for that.  The price of a bushel of soybeans for use is 
about $5.00.  That same bushel for use as seed is $12.00.  The 
farmer has to pay a couple of extra dollars to get the seed cleaned 
and prepared for planting.  So there is a $5.00 to $7.00 cost savings 
that the farmer can get, not by taking one of the technological 
innovators out of the market, but by taking a greedy seed company 
out of the market. 
So to impose, one way or another, fairly strict scrutiny on these 
exceptions that you might carve to the “you sold it, you sold it” 
kind of standard, is what I personally would see as the much better 
strategy, not only for farmer cost savings, but also for 
technological innovation.  One of the things that happens in 
herbicide-resistant genetics—there were three, maybe four 
different genetic alternatives out there which had the same 
advantage.  That is, once it was in your crop, you could blow the 
herbicide over the crop, the crop would live, the weeds would die. 
Monsanto’s strategy was such that, by guaranteeing that the 
seed companies could sell seed without the threat that the farmer 
would save seed—and I disagree with Jay on the empirics; save-
seed has almost entirely disappeared from soybeans and cotton.  
The seed companies now saw that what would happen if you had 
competing genetic alternatives that were herbicide-resistant, price 
would start to go down.  Some of the competitors would, in all 
probability, start allowing farmers to replant the seed, with much 
lower cost.  It actually happened in corn, where there were 
competing root worm—I am not getting the name quite right—
technologies—Bt corn.  There were competing technologies.  The 
price of the genetics dropped dramatically, because once it was in 
the seed, it was in the seed. 
My suggestion here is not, much as I would like to embrace it, 
total prohibition of any post-sale restriction as an absolute.  If you 
PANEL_1_TRANSCRIPT_091706_CLEAN 9/17/2006  5:48:05 PM 
2006] DOWNSTREAM LICENSING RESTRICTIONS 1047 
 
are going to do it, it has to be done very carefully, very 
circumspectly, where there is a real interest, and then it has to be 
no more anticompetitive, no more exclusionary than absolutely 
necessary to accomplish the legitimate objective.  My quarrel with 
Monsanto50 and with the other strategies that have the expansive 
reading of Mallinckrodt51 is that it goes way beyond that. 
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you.  Jay? 
PROF. KESAN: Peter makes a couple of interesting points.  If 
you go and talk to most of the seed producers, they will tell you 
that, obviously, it is no good for them to be suing farmers.  These 
are their ultimate customers, and they have longstanding 
relationships with them.  Indeed, some of them, as a matter of 
policy, refuse to do that.  For example, DuPont-Pioneer refuses to 
sue ultimate farmers.  They may sue seed companies, but they 
don’t sue farmers. 
There is a whole lot going on in this area.  There are other 
countries that are experimenting with exactly the sorts of things 
that Peter is talking about, where you don’t make farmers pay, but 
you make other people in the value chain pay.  For example, for 
those of you who are not that familiar with this industry, Argentina 
is basically the mirror image of the United States in the Southern 
Hemisphere, and so northern Argentina looks like southern United 
States.  The crops that grow there are very similar.  They are the 
second and third producer of soybean and corn in the world.  They 
have some very interesting experiences with GM, and they are one 
of the few countries that embraced GM in the early 1990s.  They 
are experimenting with taxes as a way of trying to see that the 
large life-science companies are paid in this area. 
We can argue about whether it makes economic sense or not, 
but the idea here is not to impose the burdens on the farmer.  Brazil 
is experimenting with payments from elevator operators—that is, 
people who actually benefit from the seed.  You are the person 
who is benefiting from this huge high yield, and so why don’t you 
pay? 
50 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 51 Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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The idea here is, once again, that there have to be other 
mechanisms that can be put in place so that the people who are 
innovating are rewarded. 
There are obviously contractual issues that I glossed over, in 
part because the Monsantos of the world are perfecting their notice 
and contracting.  So I don’t expect those things to be that much of 
an issue anymore.  They are learning from not providing proper 
notice and so on.  But, of course, there are contractual issues.  
There are players in the middle who basically buy from the 
Monsantos of the world, folks like JEM Ag Supply, in the JEM v. 
Pioneer case.52  In that particular case, the litigation came about 
because there were thousands and thousands of Pioneer seed bags 
that were found in JEM Ag Supply, and every one of these bags 
has a unique number to it, and JEM Ag Supply had not paid for it. 
So the relationship between some of these retailers and the 
Monsantos and Pioneers of the world is a bit testy.  Nevertheless, 
there is a lot going on, and there are different ways of trying to get 
at the same problem. 
MR. RICHARDS: Dick, do you want to add anything? 
MR. ULMER: I did read back through those Monsanto cases 
the other day.  The thing that kind of strikes me about them is that 
what we have here is a situation where we have a farmer with 
14,000 acres, and this guy is an admitted cheater.  He knew what 
bargain he had entered into.  He didn’t go into court and say, “This 
is a bad bargain.”  He tried to get around it.  He cheated.  He saved 
the seed.  He went out and planted it.  I have a hard time feeling 
too sorry for him, I have to say. 
PROF. KESAN: I entirely agree, and I do commend a Web site 
to your reading, if you guys love this stuff.  It is 
percyschmeiser.com.  Percy Schmeiser is the equivalent of Homan 
McFarling in Canada, and his case went up all the way to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, where he also lost.  But he has this 
great Web site.  He is greeting all the world officials and so on and 
so forth.  He is a farmer who is on a crusade.  It’s just a lot of fun. 
MR. RICHARDS: Mark? 
 52 J.E.M Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
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PROF. PATTERSON: I just want to respond to a couple of 
things that Mr. Ulmer said a moment ago.  If an IP owner is 
misusing the IP, then ignoring the IP rights is not cheating.  It is 
true that Mr. Scruggs might have ignored the IP rights, but he did 
not feel the IP rights were being used validly—just as was true for 
Zeidenberg in the ProCD case.53
The other thing I wanted to talk about is—Mr. Ulmer, I think, 
teed up the issue really well in this idea that Lexmark wanted to 
enter the remanufacturing business.  I think that is right, and that’s 
great that it wants to enter the remanufacturing business.  Then it 
has this Prebate program.  Of course, the Prebate on the cartridge 
that you are not allowed to refill is the same as having a surcharge 
on the cartridge that you do want to refill.  So, basically, they want 
to compete in the remanufacturing business, but the way they want 
to do it is by requiring those who want to have somebody else refill 
their cartridges pay a surcharge, thus putting them at a 
disadvantage.  So Lexmark wants to compete, but only with the 
leg-up that is provided by the surcharge on the refillable cartridges. 
The question, I think, is, do you think that the fact that it 
manufactures the cartridge should entitle it to get a leg up in the 
remanufacturing business?  I think some people think that it 
should, that basically these cartridges were created by it.  This is 
sort of Mr. Ulmer’s point; it is a question of the distribution of the 
market.  Other people would take the view that the 
remanufacturing business is separate from the manufacturing 
business—at least it could be, depending on the patent rights—and 
thus the fact that it manufactures these cartridges shouldn’t allow it 
to have an advantage in the remanufacturing business. 
MR. RICHARDS: We have a few minutes for some questions 
or comments from the floor, if anybody has any. 
QUESTION: My name is Michael Rand, and I am not a 
lawyer—at least not yet. 
I have two questions.  The first is a general set of questions.  It 
sounds like what is happening here, in terms of overall process, is 
that these companies are waging business by law—like waging 
 53 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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war, only in this case, waging business by law, or competing.  I 
realize there might be certain things that can’t be said, but I am just 
wondering, overall, if people on the panel know whether the 
companies bring in lawyers in the process of product development 
and realize what might happen as time progresses—that they might 
be sued, that they would have to put aside money to deal with it; if 
they design the product in a certain way, it would have legal 
implications this way or not have legal implications that way, et 
cetera.  How much, in the process of doing business, is law 
involved? 
A second question I have—I guess to the gentleman at the 
end—is, when can you go too far?  We are hearing now in the 
news the Sony case,54 with the rootkit software, where, in order to 
protect their CDs—you made the point, if the CDs could reproduce 
at night, they might get upset.  They are upset, and now they seem 
to have gone too far.  I heard a presenter in another conference say 
that Sony might have shot itself in the foot, because one division 
wants to protect the CDs, but the other divisions want to use open-
source software to create new products, and now they can’t 
because of all this stuff going on.  Can you go too far?  Now the 
lawyers, of course, are fighting it out, because there could have 
been real damage. 
MR. RICHARDS: Jay, since half is addressed to you, and I 
think you can probably deal with the other half as well, maybe you 
will take it. 
PROF. KESAN: Can you go too far?  That is always a concern.  
It is a concern for every person who operates in the patent world.  
They will tell you that a lot of times that is why it is very common 
in the patent world to go after intermediate players for contributory 
infringement and actively inducing infringement—271(b)55 and 
271(c)56—instead of going after the direct infringer, because the 
direct infringer is very often a customer.  Right here we have a 
situation where Monsanto is going after the direct customer, but 
 54 24/7 Records, Inc. v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 429 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 55 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006). 
 56 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006). 
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DuPont-Pioneer is not.  So there is a realization that this is an 
issue. 
At the same time, I think there is a concern that if you are 
going to be slumbering on your IP rights, that is going to create 
problems of its own. 
PROF. CARSTENSEN: May I say something about the first 
part of that question, the lawyer part? 
I can’t think of the name of the paper right now, but one paper 
that I recall hearing found that there was a correlation between 
number of patents and number of lawyers working for a 
corporation, but no correlation between the research and 
development and the number of patents being sought.  That is, the 
patents are more a function of the lawyer than of the research and 
development. 
It is, I think, the case, increasingly, that lawyers are getting 
involved earlier in the product-development process, especially 
when you do have all these wonderful levers you can pull—shrink-
wrap, tag licenses that start imposing restrictions.  Then, thinking 
through some of the puzzles that Jay is talking about, about the 
scope of your entitlements, getting the lawyers involved early here 
makes sense. 
There is a Wall Street Journal article about lawyers in the 
design of cars, where Ford has its lawyers in very early in the 
automobile design, explaining the risks, alternatives, and getting 
the lawyers’ advice about which risks to take.  Apparently, they 
did learn something from their Pinto gas tank experience. 
MR. RICHARDS: We will take just one more question. 
QUESTION: I will start it as a question to Prof. Patterson, but 
anyone on the panel can join in.  I am just thinking about the 
Lexmark cartridge.  I don’t know exactly the facts.  I am just 
spinning it as a hypothetical.  The company, Lexmark, keeps all 
the expense of the development and all the expense of 
manufacturing the cartridge, and it sells the cartridge.  That 
cartridge is probably a relatively low-margin business.  Refilling 
the cartridge doesn’t require the capital expenditures.  It is a high-
margin business.  If you will not give Lexmark a leg up on the 
secondary market compensation, wouldn’t that require Lexmark to 
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raise the price on the initial sale of the cartridge?  In the Monsanto 
case, if you can sell only one bag of seeds and then you allow them 
to resell it and store it, then that bag will be a $100 million bag. 
So won’t, in all practicality, it come out the same? 
PROF. PATTERSON: Sure.  I think that is right, but I don’t 
think it’s a problem.  We don’t worry when, say, a patentee comes 
up with a new invention that has competition out there, and 
therefore he is not able to price it where he would like.  This is 
similar.  I think the fact that you have a patent means you can 
prevent other people from doing the same thing, but it doesn’t 
entitle you to any particular profit level as a result of making the 
invention.  So the fact that patent law might be structured in such a 
way as to let you make less money than you would like to make 
does not mean that patent law is structured incorrectly, I would 
say. 
MR. RICHARDS: As long as the amount you make is 
sufficient to enable you to carry on with your innovation.  That is, I 
think, the balance point which is very difficult to determine and 
can only be done empirically, because there is no accurate way of 
coming up with it.  We see these problems, and maybe sometimes 
we try to correct them and sometimes we just let them sit there 
until the next generation takes over. 
I think that probably is where we have to end this morning.  
Thank you all very much.  Thank you to the panel.  Thank you for 
your questions. 
 
